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Abstract: 
Health (particularly of the soul [Seele]) is a central concept in Nietzsche’s work. Yet in the most 
philosophically-sophisticated secondary literature on Nietzsche, there has been fairly little sustained 
treatment of just what Nietzschean health consists in. In this paper, I aim to provide an account of 
some of the central marks of this health: resilience, discipline, vitality, a certain positive condition of 
the will to power, a certain tendency toward integration, and so on. This exposition and discussion 
will be the main task of the paper. Then in the concluding section of the paper, I consider a line 
taken in some related secondary literature, which would suggest that health might ultimately be 
understood in formal or dynamic terms, relating to one’s will to power and/or the unity of one’s 
drives. I will present the beginnings of an argument against such an account of health. In focusing on 
the formal and dynamic side exclusively, it cannot get the full story. In particular, it seems to me to 
miss the substantive dimension that is essential if we are to understand health properly. As I shall 
suggest, the core concept of Nietzschean health is not fully explicable except by reference to 
normative terms.
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I. Introduction
One of Nietzsche’s prime complaints about the ascetic ideal and its priestly propagators is 
that they have ruined ‘the health of the soul’ [seelische Gesundheit] (GM, III:22). Yet what would a 
‘healthy’ Nietzschean soul be like? It is, after all, one of the foremost characteristics of the ‘higher 
types’ or ‘great individuals’ that Nietzsche celebrates.  Yet in the most philosophically-sophisticated 1
anglophone secondary literature on Nietzsche, there has been fairly little sustained treatment of just 
what Nietzschean health consists in.  In this paper,  I aim to provide an account of some of the 
central marks of this health: resilience, discipline, vitality, a certain positive condition of the will to 
power, a certain tendency toward integration, and so on. This exposition and discussion will be the 
main task of the paper. 
 As rightly noted in Leiter (2002, 118-9)1
 2
Then  in  the  concluding  section  of  the  paper,  I  consider  a  line  taken  in  some  related 
secondary literature, which would suggest that health might ultimately be understood in formal or 
dynamic terms, relating to one’s will to power and/or the unity of one’s drives. I will present the 
beginnings of an argument against such an account of health. In focusing on the formal and dynamic 
side exclusively, it cannot get the full story. To get what Nietzsche is after, we must move beyond this 
to a more substantive account that does not shy away from full-blooded normative judgments about 
the quality of particular drives in the self and the worth of their aims.  2
Now, all parties in this debate should admit that health is a notion freighted with normative 
weight. Along with life-aﬃrmation, power, ‘life’, creativity, artistic achievement, cultural splendor, 
and so  on,  it  forms one of  the  central  elements  in  a  Nietzschean conception of  goods.  It  is  a 
normative ideal to be healthy; that much is clear.  But what I want to suggest is that health is a 3
notion that is  itself  shot through with the normative:  Not just  does a  judgment of  health have 
normative implications. Rather, the core concept of Nietzschean health is not fully explicable except 
by reference to substantive normative terms. It matters not only that the drives are powerful and 
unified. It matters in addition what drives are regnant, and whether (by Nietzsche’s lights)  those 
drives are worthwhile and whether they ought to be regnant. In this respect, I take my lead from 
Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick’s conception of the Nietzschean soul and the necessity they 
see in employing a normative dimension in understanding it.  Following the spirit of their view and 4
extending it to a consideration of health, I will lay some preliminary groundwork for the case that 
 I am indebted to Alex Prescott-Couch for suggesting this terminology of the ‘substantive’, which forms a 2
more natural contrast with the formal and dynamic. I also distinguish my account from the opposing view by 
couching it as normative as opposed to purely descriptive. The two terms fit together in the following way: My 
suggested account is substantive in calling for a key normative dimension that the opposing formal-dynamic view 
lacks. 
 Letteri (1990). 3
 Clark and Dudrick (2012). 4
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the health of the soul, for Nietzsche, cannot be adequately understood without making recourse to 
these substantively normative considerations. 
The plan for my paper will be as follows. In Section II, I make some preliminary remarks 
and caveats to frame the investigation. In Section III, I enumerate some of the key characteristics of 
Nietzschean health that he mentions across a range of diﬀerent texts. In Section IV, I will sketch a 
prima  facie  plausible  way  of  thinking  about  health  in  formal  and  dynamic  terms  that  might  be 
extrapolated from extant work in the secondary literature. Yet I suspect this approach, on its own, is 
not going to do the trick. Unless we supplement the formal and dynamic account with normative 
notions, we won’t capture the marks enumerated in Sect. III. 
II. Preliminaries
To begin with, the very idea of giving a Nietzschean account of health might seem utterly 
misguided. In The Gay Science Nietzsche warns us that there is not  a health of the soul (GS, 120). 
Indeed, he says that there is no ‘health in itself ’ [an sich] and there are ‘innumerable healths’. How 
can we proceed, in the face of this warning? This might seem to scupper the entire enterprise of 
giving a Nietzschean account of health at all. But when we look more closely at the passage, we see 
that  its  anti-universalist  tenor  is  not  inconsistent  with  there  being  a  core  notion  of  health, 
understood in a suitably general way. I don’t think Nietzsche means to deny that there is such a 
general notion of health. His claim instead is that the valence of particular characteristics will be 
diﬀerent in diﬀerent cases. We need to interpret these characteristics in the context of one another 
in order to determine whether they redound to health or not. What may be a detriment to overall 
health in the case of one person may be a boon to overall health in the case of another. As such, we 
cannot infer from particular marks (or symptoms), regarded in isolation, that a person is healthy (or 
sick). Holistic interrelation of these characteristics is crucial. Ascetic behaviors are an example that 
Nietzsche himself gives. Suppose we meet a person who abstains from alcohol and sex. This ascetic 
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abstemiousness alone will not, in and of itself, be decisive. If the person is doing this because these 
are  distractions  from  his  philosophical  endeavors  (Cf.,  GM,  III:9),  then  the  asceticism  will 
potentially mean something very diﬀerent from what it would mean in the case of someone who has 
decided on this course of action in an attempt to mortify his flesh, in sympathy with the suﬀering of 
Jesus Christ. This abstemiousness is potentially a condition of health in the one case, and a symptom 
of sickness in the other. So we can’t equate abstemiousness (or a range of other characteristics, for 
that matter) one-for-one with sickness or with health. There is no ‘health in itself ’ (GS, 120) because 
there is no coarse-grained feature, specified in isolation, that is always a mark of health (or sign of 
sickness).  And  there  are  ‘innumerable  healths’  (GS,  120)  because  there  are  manifold  diﬀerent 
combinations of these features that can constitute health.  That said, we can mark oﬀ some general 5
features, albeit with the caveat that their application in particular cases may be a tricky matter, 
either because of this holistic interaction of features, or because of other aspects of the surrounding 
context. 
Second, the sort of Nietzschean health at issue is not just bodily health, but a broader kind 
of spiritual health—a seelische Gesundheit (GM, III:22). The two can coincide. A person can be healthy 
in body and healthy in soul. But they can also come apart. A person can, in certain respects, be in 
poor bodily health, yet nonetheless be in excellent spiritual health. Nietzsche would himself be an 
example here. Although he suﬀered from chronic headaches, gastric problems, vision diﬃculties, and 
so on, he was, by his own account, ‘healthy at core’ [im Grunde gesund] (EH, ‘Wise,’ 2), as reflected in 
his outlook on life, his vitality, resilience, and the like—perhaps even in other bodily features his 
frequent ailments belied. While it is nonetheless true that various sicknesses of the soul may have 
physiological  underpinnings  (GM,  III:15-17),  physical  debilities  needn’t  move  in  tandem  with 
spiritual debilities. When we are talking about health in this context, we must bear in mind the sort 
of health at issue, because we might otherwise be prone to think we could understand this health as 
 Cp. Welshon (1992).5
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simply the bodily health of the human biological animal. Yet such health is neither necessary nor 
suﬃcient for the sort of spiritual health at issue. 
The  third  point  to  note  is  that  health  and  sickness,  for  Nietzsche,  exist  in  a  complex 
interplay. This is sometimes a matter of bodily sickness enabling a higher form of spiritual health. 
Nietzsche, for example, describes how his ailments have led him to a greater intellectual condition 
and vitality (EH, ‘Wise’ 1-2).  Moreover, Nietzsche sometimes talks of ‘the great health’ (GS, 382; 6
EH, ‘Zarathustra,’ 2). This form of health is closely bound up with sickness in that it is possible only 
through a certain overcoming of sickness. It is won through long, arduous struggle. As Nietzsche will 
put it, one does not just ‘have’ it, but ‘acquires it continually’ (GS, 382). While it is important to bear 
this form of health in mind, I think it would be a mistake to extrapolate from this condition to 
something true of all spiritual health, let alone of all health.  This close constitutive dependence 7
between health and the overcoming of sickness (physical and spiritual) is a feature of a particularly 
exalted kind of health; indeed, the very fact that Nietzsche marks the form of health oﬀ in this way, 
with the special adjective ‘great,’ would suggest that not all health is like this. Other kinds of health 
are instead largely a matter of one’s constitution and standing dispositions. They are, in the terms 
Nietzsche uses,  something one simply has,  and does not need to ‘gain continually.’  Nonetheless, 
there is an important truth in the related idea that spiritual health (of an advanced form) would not 
have been possible without spiritual sickness. The ‘internalization’ of man, and the attendant ‘bad 
conscience’, arguably are key steps on the route to this higher and more modern form of spiritual 
health.8
 ‘In the midst of torments that go with an uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by the laborious 6
vomiting of phlegm, I possessed a dialectician’s clarity par excellence and thought through with very cold blood 
matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not cold enough’ (EH, 
‘Wise’, 1). 
 For a discussion of ‘the great health’, see Richardson (1996, 137-8).7
 Neuhouser (2014) makes an analogous argument relating to the development of autonomy. 8
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Fourth, a discussion of Nietzschean health enmeshes us with a number of closely-related 
notions:  the great individual, the higher type, flourishing [das Gedeihen], being one who has ‘turned 
out well’ [wohlgeraten] (EH, ‘Wise’, 2), being whole (cf. TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 49), and so on. We might ask 
to what extent these categories are overlapping. Yet one suspects that with many of these notions, 
Nietzsche does not use his terms with the fineness of grain to render decisive answers to these sorts 
of questions. But we simply have to work with what we have.
Fifth,  when  it  comes  various  characteristics,  it  is  not  always  entirely  clear  whether  the 
feature is a constituent of health, or a necessary, perhaps just frequent, concomitant of health. That 
is, a healthy person might have characteristic x, but this might not be what makes the person healthy 
and might not be something whose presence explains (at least in part) the fact that the person is 
healthy. (To use a mundane example relating to bodily health, using many kleenex is correlated with 
not being healthy, because it is correlated with having a cold or allergies. But it is not something 
whose presence explains the person’s being sick, as would the presence of rhinoviral particles or a 
histamine reaction.) When we press on these distinctions, we can get into rather murky territory. 
But it will be important to have the issue in view as we proceed, since much turns on how well 
various general accounts of health make sense of the key features of health. 
Finally, we often get a richer characterization from Nietzsche of the negative side of things—
of the ‘ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned’ (GM, I:11) and their psychic failings.  In 
such instances, we need to infer what the correlative positive characteristics would be that such a 
person  lacks.  That  sort  of  reconstruction  is  something  I  will  attempt  in  what  follows.  These 
preliminary points and cautions aside, I would now like to turn to a discussion of some of the central 
characteristics of Nietzschean health.  
III. Characteristics of Health
a. Will to Power
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Given the centrality of the will to power in Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology, it will need 
to play a central role in an account of the health of the soul.  It would take us quite far afield to get 9
into the details of how this doctrine should be interpreted. But it should be fairly uncontroversial to 
say that this is one of the central motivational impulses in human beings (maybe the central one, 
somehow structuring all others).  How does it figure into the story about health? A good place to 10
begin is with what Nietzsche says about the nobles in GM I. Their characteristic features include ‘a 
powerful  physicality,  a  flourishing,  abundant,  even overflowing  health,  together  with  that  which 
serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves 
vigorous, free, joyful activity’ (GM, I:7). Health is thus here connected with a powerful vigor and 
with a range of characteristic activities that draw on, express, and support that. Adventure–say the 
trek up the mountain peak–requires a healthy person to undertake it, if it is to be a success. The 
undertaking of the adventure thereby expresses that health. And it also supports or preserves it, in 
much the way regular jogging keeps up one’s endurance. Although Nietzsche does not here mention 
the will to power explicitly, given what we know about that psychological doctrine, his description of 
the nobles in the Genealogy would seem to be one in which they have the will to power to a strong 
degree, are exercising that will to power regularly, and are healthy because they do so. (With these 
marauding and simple-minded nobles, the emphasis is on physical activities. In more modern forms, 
 For  a  good  discussion  of  the  place  of  the  will-to-power  in  Nietzsche’s  philosophical  psychology,  see 9
Katsafanas (2013b). 
 It is sometimes claimed that the will to power involves wanting to encounter and to overcome obstacles and 10
resistances, something that both Bernard Reginster (2006) and Paul Katsafanas (2013a) have stressed. This is an 
important point to make. But there is then a danger of a slide from this attractive and plausible position to 
another, which would claim that this is what will to power fundamentally is a will to. We must also remember 
that power may include the capabilities and reserves of energy that enable one to achieve this overcoming as 
well as the dominion achieved once one has successfully overcome them (even if these challenges, now bested, 
will soon be supplanted with others). Obstacles and resistances may be part of what one must will in willing 
power,  but it  would be dubious to think that  they are the whole story.  Furthermore,  although Nietzsche 
sometimes stresses the feeling of power [Machtgefühl], and the value of such feelings, it is important not to 
conflate power with the feeling of power (Contra Soll (2015)). For one can have the feeling of power without 
having power, and have power without the feeling of power. The will to power is not a will to a feeling only. 
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the will to power might also find healthy expression in artistic, political, and intellectual realms as 
well.)  11
In order to bring into sharper focus what this  healthy will  to power involves,  we might 
consider the unhealthy person and what goes wrong in his case. Is the problem that he lacks the will 
to  power?  Sometimes  this  would  seem to  be  the  right  diagnosis.  Consider  the  last  man  (TSZ, 
‘Prologue’). He has no appetite for striving and prefers comfortable satisfaction. The will to power 
may take minor forms in his case (struggling to finish oﬀ the mignardises at the end of the three-star 
meal), but because he prefers pleasure and comfort, it will be a shadow of what it is in the strong, 
vigorous noble described in the Genealogy. The sickness here is that the will to power is apathetically 
stunted.12
Yet sometimes the issue is not with the presence or strength of the will to power, but rather 
with its mode of expression. There are some weak, sick people who nonetheless have very strong 
wills-to-power. This is true of the priests in GM I.  Their power must take subterranean channels 13
(e.g., revaluing their enemies’ values) because it cannot express itself in an act of direct revenge. In 
not coming at this power directly, the will to power, it might be thought, is somehow turning away 
from its essential end.  On one way this deformation in the will to power has been couched, there 14
are certain ways in which the will to power takes an active form, and other problematic ways, such as 
this with the priests, in which it takes a reactive form.  This distinction is rather obscure at a first 15
pass, but John Richardson has done admirable work in trying to explicate it in a clearer way. On 
 We might also contrast the marauding nobles of GM with the more artistically-refined nobles of BT. (Thanks 11
to Ken Gemes for suggesting this point). 
 It can sometimes seem as though the will  to power is an unalterable feature of human psychology that 12
retains its fundamental dynamic force. It never really dissipates. It is simply re-channelled in diﬀerent ways. As 
with the will-to-power psychology in general, this hydraulic model can sometimes loom large as a totalizing 
explanation of human behavior. But I think we should be cautious about taking it too far. 
 On the ‘unhealthy’ condition of the priests, see GM, I:6; GM III:15. 13
 Richardson (1996, 39)14
 Deleuze (1983 [1962]); Richardson (1996). 15
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Richardson’s  reconstruction,  with  the  active  forms  of  the  will  to  power,  the  agent’s  power  is 
dependent upon her for the direction it takes. By contrast, with the reactive forms of the will to 
power,  the  agent  is  taking  her  direction  from foreign  forces,  whether  simply  obeying  them,  or 
reacting against them.  However we ultimately understand the failing here, the important thing to 16
bear  in  mind  is  that  there  are  two  basic  problems  when  it  comes  to  the  will-to-power.  One 
deformation of the will to power is a decline in its strength, at the limit its virtual disappearance. 
Another  is  for  its  strength  to  stay  the  same,  or  close  to  the  same,  but  to  be  expressed  in  a 
problematically reactive or pathological way (GM, I:7). 
b. Ressentiment
Closely  paralleling  the  active-reactive  divide  just  mentioned,  there  is  also  the  issue  of 
ressentiment  and  how  it  is  dealt  with.  Although  it  might  seem  that  ressentiment  is  not  a 
characteristic  of  the  healthy,  this  is  not  actually  what  Nietzsche  claims.  Instead,  the  important 
diﬀerence  lies  in  whether  the  ressentiment  is  merely  episodic  or  a  standing  feature  of  one’s 
character, and relatedly in whether this ressentiment gets discharged. Let us take the latter first: A 
sign of health is that ressentiment, when it appears, quickly dissipates. A mark of sickness is that 
rather than being discharged, it remains and festers. Nietzsche writes: 
For the ressentiment of the noble human being, when it appears in him, runs its course and 
exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, therefore it does not poison…To be unable for any 
length of time to take his enemies, his accidents, his misdeeds themselves seriously—that is 
 Richardson (1996, 41). My own hunch, which I won’t be able fully to substantiate here, is that this helpful 16
gloss may not do all the philosophical work it needs to. Some ‘foreign’ forces are fine, and others originating 
within the agent are problematic. Consider in the former case a galvanizing opponent who awakens one and 
sets one on a course of accomplishment, and in the latter case, a powerful but problematic drive (e.g., toward 
sterile cleanliness above all else) that is innate to the agent and sets one’s course.  Is one reactive in the former 
case, and active in the latter? If so, one would break the connection, which seems central to their technical 
meaning, that the ‘active’ is positively valenced and the ‘reactive’ negatively valenced.
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the sign of strong, full natures in which there is a excess of formative, reconstructive, healing 
power that makes one forget (a good example of this from the modern world is Mirabeau, 
who had no memory for insults and base deeds committed against him and who was able to 
forgive because he–forgot). Such a human is simply able to shake oﬀ with a single shrug a 
collection of worms that in others would dig itself in (GM I:10).  17
Why is ressentiment less of a problem for the strong? First, they presumably are capable of 
taking revenge, if need be. Second, and this is the point Nietzsche really stresses in the passage, they 
don’t dwell on misdeeds or slights. Because of an “excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power” 
they can get over such things very quickly and forget about them. Matters are diﬀerent with those 
less well-constituted. They are ‘impotent’ (GM, I:7). They do not have this ‘healing power’ to be able 
to get past the slights that have been done them. Nor do they have the power to take direct revenge. 
About the priests,  of whom this is very much the case, Nietzsche writes:  ‘It is because of their 
impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual 
and poisonous kind of hatred’ (GM, I:7). The focused hatred characteristic of ressentiment, because 
it cannot get discharged through action or dissipated through forgetting, grows in strength and boils 
into something ‘poisonous’. A similar sort of ressentiment aﬄicts the slaves as well (GM I:13).
This brings us now to the second point. Whereas with the nobles, ressentiment is more 
episodic, appearing only on certain occasions, with the priests and the slaves, it is a recurring feature 
of their psyches.  Given that it can’t be discharged, it thus needs to be channeled. We get a story 18
later in the genealogy about the mechanisms through which this channeling happens. The priests are 
the ‘direction-changer[s]’ of ressentiment (GM, III:15). Rather than the ressentiment dissipating, it 
gets re-directed in two main ways: in eﬃgy against those who can’t really be the target of one's direct 
 Compared with digestion, GM III:16.17
 On this issue and the discussion that follows, I am indebted to conversation with Ken Gemes. 18
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revenge (GM, I:10), and it gets re-directed against the self, in the form of guilt and the ascetic ideal 
(GM, II-III). Although the ressentiment in a way gets exercised against the eﬃgy (the demonized 
strong) and exercised against the self, the ressentiment doesn’t actually get eﬀectively discharged. 
Since it doesn’t get discharged, the ressentiment instead persists and becomes the cornerstone of 
one’s whole evaluative outlook. Though masquerading under various more positive aliases (e.g.,  a 
instinct for ‘justice’ (GM, III:14), it becomes the centerpiece of a certain way of conceiving oneself.  19
One sees oneself as the perpetual victim, badly done by the world and by others. One dwells on the 
idea of the wrongdoers and the well-oﬀ needing to pay dearly, as well as on the thought that they will 
(GM, I:15). And in its most insidious form, transmuted into guilt, one sees oneself as the perpetual 
perpetrator  of  certain wrongs,  for  simply  existing as  an embodied creature with certain drives–
sexual, aggressive and otherwise. 
Ressentiment is, for many people, a basic fact of life and a standing vice of character. We 
might try to explain what is wrong with ressentiment in other terms. For example, we might say that 
it involves a form of self-deception or that it makes one ugly.  But, though each of these things are 20
also true of  it,  I  think we do well  to see it  as  simply bad on its  own terms too,  a  poisonously 
unhealthy condition for the human soul to be in.  
c. Instinctive desire for what is good for one. 
It is a mark, Nietzsche tells us, of the ‘well-turned out human being’ [wohlgeratener Mensch] 
that he has ‘a taste only for what is good for him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure of 
what is good for him is transgressed. He guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he 
exploits bad accidents to his advantage…’ (EH, Wise, 2; Cf., TI, ‘Maxims’, 8, ‘Errors’, 2). By contrast, 
 Wallace (2007). 19
 On the former, see Reginster (1997). For the latter, see GS, 290: ‘Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is 20
continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight’. On 
this connection between ressentiment and ugliness, see Gemes (Forthcoming). 
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a mark of the decadent is that he wants what is worst for him (CW, 5; A, 6).  The healthy thus have a 21
particular  desiderative structure (alignment between desire  and their  good)  that  reinforces  their 
healthy condition and that is also partly constitutive of that healthy condition. 
The example that Nietzsche gives to illustrate this characteristic is one of ‘choos[ing] the 
right means against wretched states’ (EH, ‘Wise’, 2). The healthy person will be drawn toward what is 
advantageous for him, the sick person drawn toward what is not advantageous. In describing how he 
responded to his own ailments, Nietzsche says he had the ‘energy to choose absolute solitude and 
leave the life to which [he] had become accustomed; the insistence on not allowing [himself] any 
longer to be cared for, waited on, and doctored—that betrayed an absolute instinctive certainty about 
what was needed above all at the time’ (EH, ‘Wise’, 2). The constitutionally sick person would have 
preferred being pampered, nursed, and pitied. Nietzsche’s point is that, however good it may have 
felt at the time, it was better that he had the instinctive desire to press on, in service to a higher 
form of self-overcoming. Many lack this instinctive desire for what is good for them. They are like 
the person who gets out of the hospital after heart surgery and can’t resist lighting up that next 
cigarette. 
In describing this as instinctive [instinctiv], Nietzsche does not need to claim that conscious 
thought  cannot  enter  the  picture  in  any  way  whatsoever.  His  point  instead  is  about  our 
predilections, convictions and motivations and their alignment with what is good for us. If we reach 
a decision about what to do after a tortuous course of to-ing and fro-ing deliberation, and with lists 
weighing pros and cons, that does not seem at all ‘instinctive’. Nor is it instinctive, if we must force 
ourselves, like Kantian moral saints, to perform some action we really don’t desire to do. Healthy 
people have motivation to do what needs doing, a predilection toward that course of action, and a 
conviction in its rightness as the thing to be done. 
 Leiter (2002, 158).21
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d. Resilience
One of Nietzsche’s most famous lines is that what doesn’t kill [umbringt]  one, makes one 
stronger (EH, ‘Wise’ 2; TI, ‘Maxims’, 8). In one sense, it is obviously false that, by Nietzsche’s lights, 
what doesn’t kill one makes one stronger. To give one of Nietzsche’s own examples: Mitleid [pity/
compassion]  enervates one (A, 7),  but presumably doesn’t kill  those it enervates.  But the ‘what 22
doesn’t kill one’ aphorism might be read, more plausibly, as a characterization of health instead. Its 
context in Ecce Homo suggests that this is what is meant by it,  coming, as it does, just after the 
characterization of the well-turned out person, as described above, who instinctively has a taste for 
what is good for him. The claim would thus be: A mark of this healthy person is that things, even 
quite challenging ones,  will  continue to make him stronger.  In the healthy person, the apparent 
setback will be something he is able to turn to his advantage. When this has ceased to be true, or if 
this  was  never  true  in  the  first  place,  then  the  person  is  not  healthy.  The  healthy  person  is 
characterized by this sort of resilience, and the sick person by its lack.  23
e. Incorporation instead of extirpation. 
Describing the characteristic attitude of ‘the church’ toward sexual, aggressive, and other 
sorts of drives, Nietzsche writes that it ‘fights passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its 
“cure” is castratism. It never asks: “How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a craving?” It has at all 
times laid the stress of discipline on extirpation (of sensuality, of pride, of the lust to rule, of avarice, 
of  vengefulness)’  (TI, ‘Morality,’  1).  Nietzsche continues:  ‘The same means in the fight against a 
craving–castration,  extirpation–is  instinctively  chosen  by  those  who  are  too  weak-willed,  too 
degenerate, to be able to impose moderation on themselves…’ (TI, ‘Morality’, 2). A mark of the sick 
 Nietzsche himself might be thought a counterexample as well. His descent into insanity didn’t kill him (at 22
least not for a decade)  and did not make him stronger. Though, as John Richardson pointed out to me in 
correspondence, this is a controversial example, since Nietzsche’s collapse might be thought to have ‘killed’ 
him in the relevant sense. 
 Cf. HH, 224. 23
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is that they need to resort to this extreme. They demonize parts of themselves and want to tear 
them out root and branch. The healthier response, often, is to be able to incorporate or integrate 
these elements into the whole that one potentially is. One way in which this incorporation is carried 
out is through something that Nietzsche calls ‘spiritualization’ (TI, ‘Morality’, 3), where a drive takes 
a  new  and  more  refined  form.  What  Nietzsche  is  describing  here  is  basically  a  process  of 
sublimation.  The underlying drive is allowed expression, but in a new form, consonant with the 24
agenda of a master drive. To use an example later made famous by Freud, Leonardo da Vinci could be 
said to have sublimated his homoerotic drive into artistic activity.  Rather than engaging in actual 25
sexual activity with males, he focused on capturing in his art idealized depictions of the beautiful 
male body. Here were have a sexual drive getting channeled to a new purpose that is in keeping with 
Leonardo’s project of being a great artist. By contrast, consider where this sort of integration fails: 
Another person (maybe a conservative and devoted Evangelical Christian) feels these impulses to be 
deeply sinful, but can’t avoid occasionally succumbing to what he perceives to be evil temptation. 
Here the impulses are not an integrated part of him; he perceives them to be alien elements to be 
subdued or eliminated, and he may undertake a combination of chemical treatments and conversion 
therapy to have them eradicated. 
f. Positive self and world-relation. 
One of the marks of the sick, closely connected with the impulse toward radical excision, is 
that they have turned against or set upon themselves, branding parts of themselves as evil or as 
morally suspect. Describing the (nascent) form that this takes in bad conscience, Nietzsche writes: 
‘But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness,  from which humanity has not yet recovered, 
 Gemes (2009a) describes this process well. 24
 Nietzsche doesn’t describe the details of the sublimation, but mentions Leonardo in this connection in BGE 25
200. See the discussion in Gemes (2009a). Whether this is an accurate assessment of the psychology of the 
historical person Leonardo da Vinci is not really relevant for our purposes. 
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man’s suﬀering of man, of himself…’ (GM, II: 16). This suﬀering of themselves is something acutely 
characteristic  of  the  ‘whole  herd  of  the  ill-constituted,  disgruntled,  underprivileged,  [and] 
unfortunate’ (GM, III:13). As Nietzsche so eloquently describes this psychology: 
Where might one escape it, that veiled look from which one carries away a deep sadness, 
that backward-turned look of one deformed from the beginning, a look that betrays how 
such a human speaks to himself—that look that is a sigh. ‘If only I might be someone else!’ 
thus sighs this look: but there is no hope. ‘I am who I am: how could I get free of myself. 
And yet—I am fed up with myself ’ (GM, III: 14).
The unhealthy person will be unable to bear certain parts of himself, in part because he has not (and 
cannot)  sublimate  them  adequately  into  the  whole  that  he  potentially  is.  Because  he  is  so 26
distasteful to himself, he will need to resort to certain forms of self-deception. ‘His soul squints, his 
spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors…’ (GM, I:10).  The healthy person will, by 
contrast, have a positive relation to herself, a kind of happiness in who she is and what she does 
(GM, I:10). She will go on her way contentedly and ‘in good spirits’ [guten Muths] (GM, III:14). In 
particular, she will not view aspects of herself in moralized terms as evil.
In addition to having a negative attitude to themselves, the sick tend to have a negative 
attitude toward the world as a whole. ‘Read from a distant star,’ Nietzsche says, the earth can seem 
to  be  a  ‘nook of  disgruntled,  arrogant,  and  repugnant  [widrig]  creatures  filled  with  a  profound 
displeasure {Verdruss]’ not just with themselves but with ‘the earth, [with] all life’ (GM, III:11). The 
healthy, on the other hand, would seem to have a life and world-aﬃrming attitude that bespeaks a 
 On some level, given the internalization of man, a certain degree of internal division and perhaps alienation 26
will be inescapable in modern human beings. Another way of thinking about this would be to say that a certain 
degree of sickness is inescapable. But, as Nietzsche reminds us, ‘bad conscience’ is an illness as pregnancy is an 
illness (GM, II:18). He means by this that it is capable of giving birth to something new and significant. 
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positive relationship to the world.  Although even for them, nausea [Ekel] at existence (particularly 27
with ‘the rabble’) is a perpetual danger (GM III:14, EH, ‘Wise,’ 8, TSZ, ‘The Convalescent’). If they 
are to remain healthy, they must keep this nausea at bay.  28
g. Discipline
A sign of decadents, according to Nietzsche, is that they are unable to resist a stimulus. (TI, 
‘Morality’; EH, ‘Wise,’ 2). ‘…[T]he weakness of the will—or, to speak more definitely, the inability 
not to respond to a stimulus—is itself merely another form of degeneration’ (TI, ‘Morality,’ 2). When 
that rich smell of warmly baked bread wafts in his direction, the weak person can’t resist the impulse 
and stick to his no-carb diet. Nietzsche extends the same sort of analysis to consider a person’s 
instinctive attraction to Mitleid [compassion/pity].  ‘My experiences entitle me to be quite generally 29
suspicious of the s0-called “selfless” drives, of all “neighbor love” that is ready to give advice and go 
into action.  It  always seems a  weakness  to me,  a  particular  case of  being incapable of  resisting 
stimuli: Mitleid is considered a virtue only among decadents’ (EH, ‘Wise,’ 4). The healthy person will 
have a kind of self-control.    30
h. Vitality. 
 Note, for example, the sort of ideal given in BGE 56. 27
 For further discussion of this threat of nausea, see Tevenar (Forthcoming). 28
 I have left ‘Mitleid ’ untranslated, because neither ‘compassion’ nor ‘pity’ is entirely adequate. ‘Compassion’ 29
better gets the other-directed phenomenon described here, when we, in Bill Clinton lingo, feel someone’s pain 
and suﬀer with them because they are suﬀering. But one cannot translate self-directed Mitleid (a particularly 
destructive  form of  Mitleid)  as  anything  other  than  (self)-‘pity’.  My  thanks  to  Gudrun  von  Tevenar  for 
discussion on this point. 
 A related idea is an old one, stretching back to Plato. Namely, it is the thought that there is a form of 30
sickness of the soul that consists in being ruled by one’s appetitive impulses. It is usually thought that Plato 
denies that there is weakness of will in the standard philosophical sense, of acting against what one perceives 
to  be the good course  of  action.  But  there  is  another  notion of  weakness  of  will,  more in  keeping with 
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology, whereby we are of weak-will, if we are unable to impose any order on 
ourselves. That is, we are weak of will, if we are ruled by our impulses (appetitive and otherwise), rather than 
through a (proper) master drive, imposing an order on these. 
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In certain places, Nietzsche connects health with overall vitality [Vitalität  or Lebendigkeit] 
(EH, Wise’, 1; CW, 7). What does this notion amount to? We might, at a first pass, consider vitality 
in terms of a feeling of energy. But I think it would be a mistake to think that vitality is to be 
equated simply  with a  feeling  of  vitality.  Consider  the  consumptive  with the delirious  feeling  of 
vitality—Violetta Valéry in La Traviata as she stirs from her deathbed. She feels great vitality, but 
actually  her  powers  are  utterly  sapped and she  is  about  to  die.  So  the  feeling  of  energy  is  not 
necessarily a reflection on whether one’s characteristics warrant that feeling.  Those characteristics 31
would seem to be closely related to the will to power, in its strong and active form. But vitality 
doesn’t seem simply to be equivalent to that. One way of thinking about the diﬀerence with vitality 
is that it is one key aspect of the underlying power that the will to power is a will to. To have vitality 
is  to  have  the  reserves  of  psychic  and  physical  vital  strength  one  needs  in  order  to  do  things 
challenging and significant and to do so in a way that is not grudging, but fundamentally cheerful. 
Nietzsche describes Mitleid [compassion/pity] as something potentially threatening to this vitality: 
Mitleid stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing 
eﬀect.  We are  deprived  of  strength  when  we  feel  Mitleid.  That  loss  of  strength  which 
suﬀering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by Mitleid. Mitleid 
makes suﬀering contagious. Under certain circumstances, it may engender a total loss of life 
and vitality out of all proportion to the magnitude of the cause (as in the case of the death of 
the Nazarene) (A, 7).  
Healthy people have these reserves of energy; the sick typically do not. In the case of many of them, 
their vitality has been sapped, whether through compassion or self-pity or both. One characteristic 
 As Nietzsche notes in GM III:16, that someone feels healthy is plainly not suﬃcient for his actually being 31
healthy. 
 18
of this decline in life is a kind of weariness of life, not wanting to live more. This might then take the 
form of certain pessimistic judgments to the eﬀect that life is not worth living. This is a symptom 
(TI, Socrates, 2), particularly of ‘declining, weakened, weary, [and] condemned life’ (TI, ‘Morality’, 5). 
In keeping with their positive relation to themselves and the world, the healthy do not share this 
attitude. 
IV. Health in Formal and Dynamic Terms?  
Now that we have outlined some of the main characteristics of Nietzschean health, I want to 
turn to the question of whether we can get to a core notion of Nietzschean health that explains 
these diverse characteristics. To that end, I would like to consider a tempting way of thinking about 
these issues. The ambition would be to try to understand health in fundamentally descriptive (as 
opposed to normative) terms and to have the key descriptive properties be formal and dynamic ones 
concerning the strength and interrelation of the drives. The idea would be that one needn’t make 
normative  judgments  on  the  way  to  determining  whether  someone  is  healthy.  One  can  simply 
consider certain of the person’s formal and dynamic properties and arrive at one’s answer. Of course, 
the judgment that someone is healthy would have normative implications, insofar as being healthy is 
a  good  thing.  Various  characteristics  redounding  to  health  (e.g.,  strength,  unity)  would  have 
normative  implications  too.  But  the  idea  of  the  view I  am opposing  would  be  that  one  could 
determine whether someone is healthy without making any further value judgments. Such a strategy 
is particularly appealing to those who want to have a naturalistically-respectable account of health, 
since  the  properties  it  appeals  to  are  ones  seemingly  that  could  be  revealed  though  value-free 
empirical  psychological  investigation and description of  the  case.  I  will  consider  one promising 
strategy in this vein, which would appeal to the will to power and the drives and their formal and 
dynamic qualities. My suspicion is that this strategy will not work. To be clear, I’m not denying the 
relevance of formal or dynamic characteristics at all. Indeed, they are implicated in the story I’ve 
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given in the previous section. My point instead is that they cannot be the whole story. Unless we 
make substantive normative judgments about the drives and the worth of one’s aims, we won’t have 
an adequate account of Nietzschean health. 
The  formal  and  dynamic  approach  I  have  in  mind  is  suggested  (if  not  very  explicitly 
discussed) in the work of John Richardson and Ken Gemes.  It focuses both on a certain condition 32
of the will to power and on a certain condition of the drives. In addition to having a strong and 
active will to power, one would need to have one’s drives in a certain integrated unity. Indeed, the 
two elements are thought to be importantly interconnected. Unity of the relevant sort comes about 
when there is a dominant master drive—a strong manifestation of the will to power—that reins the 
other drives in and turns them toward its purpose. This view would try to account for health without 
making recourse to substantively normative notions.  It focuses just on formal and dynamic features 33
of the will to power and of the drives. I think these views have an important grain of truth to them, 
 Richardson (1996, 39-49); Gemes (2009a). (Cp., Gemes (2009b); Richardson (2009)). In the case of both 32
interpreters, neither seems to have as his primary aim to come up with an account of what fundamental health 
consists  in.  There  are  slight  diﬀerences  in  emphasis  between  them.  Although  Richardson  (1996)  puts  a 
premium on integration,  he appears  to  derive  the value of  this  integration (i.e.,  unity)  from the value of 
activeness (49), a positive condition of the will to power, which he takes to be the explanatory centerpiece of 
Nietzsche’s philosophical system (39). In this way, his view makes the will to power normatively fundamental. 
Gemes (2009a), by contrast, puts greater emphasis on integration as the heart of the story, though it is an 
important part of his account (following Richardson (1996) in this respect) that this integration is achieved 
through the imposition of order by a dominant will to power in the form of a ‘master drive’.
 Gemes (2009a)  has considered how we might separate pathological  forms of repression from beneficial 33
forms  of  sublimation.  Gemes  has  argued  that  for  Nietzsche,  repression  is  marked  by  a  pathological 
disintegration of the self,  whereas sublimation involves the integration of the self.  In repression a drive is 
pushed aside and denied expression, whereas in sublimation it is integrated into the rest of the agent’s projects 
by being channeled toward that aim. To use Freud’s example, which Gemes also uses, Leonardo sublimated his 
homoerotic drive by channeling it toward artistic ends. Instead of having sex with beautiful young men, he 
produced  idealized  artistic  depictions  of  their  bodies.  Gemes  introduces  this  Nietzschean  account  of 
sublimation-as-integration in order to try to avoid another way of thinking about what marks oﬀ sublimation, 
namely being a socially-valued achievement. Such an account would have an “ireedeemably normative” element 
(41), whereas the ambition (of the Freudian account certainly) was to provide a purely scientific or descriptive 
account, making no reference to these sorts of normative considerations. On Gemes’s account of Nietzsche, 
these  normative  considerations  do  not  enter  the  story  either.  One  corollary  of  the  view of  health  I  am 
presenting  here  is  that  we  cannot  distinguish  repression  from sublimation  without  appeal  to  normative/ 
evaluative considerations. 
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in that  they get  much  of  the story  of  what  health involves.  Yet  in  shying away from normative 
judgments, they make it diﬃcult to separate cases of health from cases of sickness. 
After  all,  consider  one of  the  central  characteristics  of  health:  instinctively  desiring  and 
doing what is good for one. This characteristic wears its normativity on its sleeve. What makes this 
characteristic obtain is partly a normative property: the fact that the course of action one is desiring 
and performing is actually good for one. Evidently, this characteristic calls for a de re reading of the 
object of the desire. For what matters to health is not simply that you desire what you regard as good 
for  you;  instead,  you  must  desire  what  is  in  fact  good  for  you.  A person’s  own  judgments  and 
inclinations on this score are notoriously misdirected and unreliable. Many, according to Nietzsche, 
erroneously believe that a course of action which is in fact destructive for them is good for them, 
and  desire  that  course  of  action  under  the  mistaken  auspices  of  its  being  good.  The  besotted 
Wagnerite  believes  that  more  Wagnerian  music  is  good  for  him,  indeed  is  his  salvation  from 
mundane reality. He thus wishes to immerse himself in this languorous sonic world every day. But if 
Nietzsche’s indictment of Wagnerians in The Case of Wagner is to be believed, this is most definitely 
not good for him. It is a mark of sickness that he wants something so destructive for his ‘nerves’ and 
health  (CW, 5-7).  As  is  characteristic  of  decadence,  though,  ‘what  one  ought  to  shun  is  found 
attractive, one puts to one’s lips what drives one further into the abyss’ (CW, 5). He desires and does 
what  is  (understood  de  re)  not  good  for  him.  Yet  how,  if  we  refused  to  make  recourse  to  any 
normative notions, could we ever identify this characteristic? In order to do so, we would need to 
consider not just descriptive facts about what the person does desire, but make a judgment about 
what he should desire, a determination of which will involve normative considerations.  
Now, it may be (indeed, likely will be) a notion of the good in play here that is somewhat 
relativized to particular types of people. But it is a normative notion all the same. The best hope for 
the formal and dynamic account, in reply, would be to try to reduce a person’s good to more basic 
descriptive formal notions, again perhaps having to do with integration of the drives and the will to 
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power.  I can’t mount a full case against that strategy here. My suspicion, however, is that unless we 
make recourse to further normative judgments, we won’t be able to distinguish the good cases from 
the bad cases, since we won’t be able to make qualitative, evaluative distinctions among diﬀerent 
eﬀective master drives and among the drives over which they rule.
One central problem in this vein is that of distinguishing the healthy creative geniuses from 
certain  kinds  of  putatively  sick,  obsessed  monomaniacs.  At  the  level  of  formal  and  dynamic 
description,  they  can  seem very  similar.  They  both  subsume all  of  their  energy  to  a  particular 
enterprise, pursuing it with a strong will-to-power in the form of a master drive. Suppose that the 
master drive manages to co-opt the other drives in the service of this guiding life enterprise. That 
enterprise may well be one of writing great poetry with single-minded devotion. But it could also be 
one of collecting aluminum cans or counting blades of grass, or indeed, and more realistically, writing 
very bad poetry, with equally single-minded devotion. Gemes is aware of this problem and brings up, 
in a similar vein, the case of the reclusive stamp collector.  This person, it is supposed, has a stamp 34
collecting master-drive that seeks to be the organizing impulse of his life’s activities. Gemes argues, 
in reply to this potential case, that given the rich panoply of drives that humans actually have, it is 
doubtful  that  such  a  person  will  be  giving  expression  to  the  full  range  of  his  drives  (to  sex, 
aggression). He is thus not actually integrated, despite having this dominant impulse.
Now, we could perhaps come up with a more fanciful version of the stamp collector case, one 
where there is some story about how the person has managed to channel his range of drives in a way 
consonant with his master drive. But that would be far-fetched, and I don’t think that we need to 
look to anything so remote. We can instead look to another monomaniac that Nietzsche himself 
discusses—namely Socrates, as described in Twilight of the Idols. (The focus here for our purposes is 
on  Nietzsche’s  characterization  of  Socrates,  however  tendentious  that  may  be,  rather  than  on 
whether this is  accurate to Socrates the historical  individual or to Plato’s eponymous character.) 
 Gemes (2009a). 34
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Although  Nietzsche  surely  finds  things  to  admire  in  Socrates’s  example,  Socrates  is  among 
Nietzsche’s paradigm cases of a sick, decadent person (TI, ‘Socrates’).  By Nietzsche’s reckoning, 35
Socrates would fail by several of the characteristics of health enumerated in Section III above. Most 
notably, he has a negative self-world relation (TI, ‘Socrates’, 1-2, 12; GS, 340), regarding life and the 
world as a sickness from which one must be freed. Yet there is another characteristic I would like to 
explore. It is the way in which reason has become dominant in Socrates and sought to co-opt the 
drives and turn them toward its own purpose (TI, ‘Socrates’, 10-11). If we view this process in formal 
and dynamic terms alone, it would seem to redound to Socrates’s health. After all, he is seemingly 
doing what the formal and dynamic account would prize as characteristic of health. Socrates has a 
strong master drive (viz., reason) which rules over his other drives.  Moreover, as I discuss below, 36
this master drive is apparently successful at turning other drives to its purpose by giving them new 
outlets. Yet given the highly negative and pathologizing terms that Nietzsche uses to describe this 
process in Socrates, it would not seem to be a mark of health. I will suggest that we can see why this 
is pathological only if we consider what is happening not just in formal and dynamic terms, but in 
normative terms as well. 
Let us review the details of the case. Socrates’s aggressive, agonal impulses get channeled 
into philosophical dialectic (TI, “Socrates,” 7-8). Instead of actually fighting physically with a person, 
he takes out his aggression by undermining his opponents’ arguments and making them thereby look 
 As Kaufmann (1974)  has sought to argue, Nietzsche has considerable admiration for Socrates. Kaufmann 35
claims that Nietzsche’s objection is not to Socrates himself, but to his doctrines and his followers. Kaufmann’s 
case, it seems to me, is not persuasive. While Socrates and Plato are indeed ‘tools of the Greek dissolution’ in 
the pernicious influence they have, they are also themselves ‘symptoms of degeneration’ (TI, ‘Socrates’,  2), 
particularly in the negative attitudes to life that their  ‘physiological’  condition disposes them toward (TI, 
‘Socrates’, 2). Kaufmann’s reading also soft-pedals the disdainful, ad hominem tenor of the attack that we get in 
Twilight  in  particular:  Socrates,  Nietzsche says,  is  among other  things,  ‘ugly’,  ‘plebs’,  a  ‘monstrum  in  fronte, 
monstrum in animo’ (‘Socrates’, 3). Whatever admiration Nietzsche had for Socrates, the critical, and especially 
pathologizing tone in these passages is impossible to ignore. Socrates is decadent and sick. 
 The form of ‘reason’  that (by Nietzsche’s  lights)  is  ruling in Socrates’s  psyche is  far  from the valorized 36
conception of  reason that Plato has in mind.  It  is  not as  if  Nietzsche accepts  Plato’s  characterization of 
‘reason’  and  basic  moral  psychology,  but  simply  disagrees  about  whether  reason  should  be  ruling.  Their 
disagreements are more fundamental, and their characterizations of ‘reason’ are somewhat divergent.
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foolish.  And  Socrates’  erotic  impulses—Socrates,  as  Nietzsche  tells  us,  was  “a  great  erotic”  (TI, 
“Socrates,”  8)—get channeled into philosophy as well.  While Nietzsche does not address this  in 
detail,  surely,  in  noting  this  about  Socrates,  he  must  have  in  mind  some  of  what  is  explicitly 
thematized in the Symposium and in the “Great Speech” from the Phaedrus. In seeing the beautiful 
boy, one’s soul is led from the beauty of this particular boy in an upward chain to the contemplation 
of beauty, and onwards to the forms and most of all the form of the good–these being the objects of 
philosophical  contemplation.  Socrates’s  master  drive,  oriented  toward  a  zealously  rationalistic 
philosophy,  thus  turns  these  apparently  baser  drives  (aggressive  and  sexual)  into  his  main 
philosophical life project. The objection I am making is this: Described in formal and dynamic terms 
alone, Socrates would seem to be undertaking a healthy form of sublimation. Yet this is at odds with 
the very negative terms in which Nietzsche couches what transpires: Socrates is a monster who has 
made reason a “tyrant” (TI, “Socrates,” 10)—and not in a good way.  The dominance of this master 37
drive over the other drives, and co-option of them, is not a deliverance from disease, or a return to 
“‘virtue,’” but merely another expression of the underlying disease (TI, “Socrates, 11). 
The lesson here, to my mind, is that it is not enough to count as a mark of health that one 
has a strong and eﬀective master drive that manages to turn one’s other drives to its purpose, and to 
allow them an expression consonant with that purpose. It matters which master drive is doing the 
ruling and whether that’s the sort of drive that should be ruling.  When Nietzsche claims that reason 38
is made “a tyrant” in the case of Socrates, the problem is not that reason is an ineﬀective ruler. It is 
that reason is an inappropriate ruler. The wrong drive is in a position of authority. Nefarious tyrants 
 Although the connotations of ‘tyrant’ are generally negative, including in Nietzsche’s discussion of Socrates, 37
Nietzsche in one place talks about ‘tyrannizing’ in a more positive light. See KSA 12:39. (Thanks to Ken Gemes 
for mentioning this passage.) In making reason in Socrates out to be a ‘tyrant,’ Nietzsche, I believe, is sticking 
the knife in by drawing on this freighted Platonic term, familiar from the ‘regimes of the soul’ in the Republic, 
Bk VIII. While Socrates does not fit the bill of the Platonic tyrannical man, Nietzsche is meaning to suggest 
that his soul has an inappropriate form of governance with a ruler (reason) who should not be ruling. Nietzsche 
thereby questions, in a rhetorically playful way, the Platonic valorization of reason as the proper governing 
force in the soul. 
 Clark and Dudrick (2012) rightly stress the importance of whether a drive has the “right” to rule. 38
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may get  their  way,  but  the important  point  is  that  they shouldn’t  get  their  way.  Now,  that  said, 
Nietzsche is never very clear about what drive should be ruling in place of Socratic reason. Indeed, 
the picture of unity on oﬀer (one strong drive ruling the others) may well be misconceived. On an 
alternative Schillerian model of integration (i.e., “unity”) that Paul Katsafanas (2011) has attributed to 
Nietzsche,  it  does  not  consist  in  one  drive  ruling  over  the  other  drives,  though  such  a  power 
structure  is  frequently  conducive  to  integration.  Rather,  integration  consists  in  a  harmonious 
relation between the reflective and unreflective parts of the self. I don’t adjudicate between these 
two models here. Even if one of these is the correct model of integration (and, relatedly, of successful 
agency or freedom ), they are not, I believe, the correct models of health. For one can live up to 39
these standards, and still be pathological, in virtue of the quality of the drive that is dominant.  This 40
sort of normative evaluation, I want to suggest, is crucial. Formal and dynamic notions will not carry 
us all the way, because they will deprive us of the ability to make key evaluative judgments, especially 
about the kind of master drive in power and whether it is suited to being in power. 
I’d like now to consider one further point in closing. So far, I have accepted for the sake of 
argument the idea that integration is necessary for health. But I’d now like to probe a bit further 
what that means. It might be construed to mean that we need to take the elements (particularly the 
drives)  that we are faced with and do something with them that may transmute them, but still 
preserves them. It is sometimes assumed that there is something wrong with seeking to eliminate a 
drive, or with refusing to allow it expression. But consider what Nietzsche says in The Gay Science in 
the famous passage about “‘giv[ing] style’” to one’s character: 
 Katsafanas (2011); Gemes (2008); Richardson (2008). 39
 I have not taken a stand on whether Socrates, following the imposition of order by his reason drive, is 40
unified or integrated, because I have not taken a stand on what integration and unity consist in. My own 
suspicion  is  that  a  formal-dynamic  account  can’t  even  adequately  explain  integration  and  unity,  in  their 
valorized Nietzschean senses, let alone explain health. But my focus in this paper is on health. To my mind, the 
following  is  clear:  Socrates  begins  with  a  certain  “anarchy  of  the  instincts”  (TI,  “Socrates,”  4)  which  he 
tyrannically overcomes through an eﬀective master drive (reason) that turns other drives toward its purpose. 
But he is sick, partly in virtue of this arrangement of soul, not despite it. 
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It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit 
them into  an  artistic  plan  until  every  one  of  them appears  as  art  and  reason  and  even 
weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece 
of original nature has been removed–both times through long practice and daily work at it. 
Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and 
made sublime.  Much that  is  vague and resisted shaping  has  been saved and exploited for 
distant views… (290)
In this passage, he clearly allows that certain elements can be removed as part of this process of self-
cultivation. So it is not just a matter of preserving and re-channeling what is there. In a similar vein, 
in Daybreak, Nietzsche gives advice for various ways in which we might combat the vehemence of a 
drive. Among his advice is the following: “First of all we may avoid opportunities for satisfying the 
drive, weakening and eventually making it wither and fall away [abdorren machen] by refraining from 
satisfying it for increasingly longer periods of time” (D, 109). If a drive can be deadened in this way, it 
might well be better to follow this course of action rather than trying to integrate it. Of course 
certain drives may be ineradicable, so the sensible strategy is to do something useful with it. But in 
the case of other drives, this is not so.
It is, I suggest, not necessarily unhealthy to work toward removing a problematic part of 
yourself, rather than seeking to incorporate it. And it is not necessarily healthy to integrate all the 
parts  of  yourself  together,  as  opposed  to  trying  to  rid  yourself  of  a  certain  problematic  part. 
Normativity  makes  an  entrance  again:  It  matters  whether  the  part  (or  drive)  actually  is  worth 
retaining (in its present or a transmuted form).
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However, one might well think of integration as the ideal, with elimination as a second best 
(and  not  necessarily  unhealthy)  alternative.  But  let  us  consider  the  grounds  for  thinking  that 41
integration is always better. I can think of three potential reasons. The first is that being integrated 
realizes an aesthetic ideal of unity. The person who is not integrated is allegedly an aesthetic failure.  42
The second is that it is supposed to take more strength to be able to integrate successfully, so it is a 
mark of one’s character that one does this. The third is that working toward integration is a sign that 
one is satisfied with oneself, whereas a tendency toward elimination is supposed to be a sign that one 
is dissatisfied with oneself. 
I don’t think any of these supposed grounds provide decisive reason to prefer integration 
over elimination in all circumstances where both are possible routes. Let us make this more specific 
in terms of a particular case. Suppose you have a strong drive toward alcohol. This prompts you, on 
occasion, to keep drinking to excess after you’ve had quite enough.  Suppose as well that you are not 43
happy with this drive to alcohol. What can you do about it? Here are two options open to you: You 
can  seek  to  integrate  this,  incorporating  the  alcohol  drive  into  your  self-conception  and  self-
presentation. (Lest this seem far-fetched, I have several Facebook friends who seem to have taken up 
this approach. Mentions of frequent and debauched gin consumption figure prominently in their 
status updates.) Or you can follow the advice of Daybreak 109 to try to weaken or deaden this drive 
in some of the ways Nietzsche suggests in that passage. It is thus not clear to me that integrating 
this drive should be any better than seeking to weaken or eliminate it (provided, of course, that you 
can). Consider the first potential grounds for preferring integration. Is it aesthetically better to be 
integrated? Here,  I  think it  depends partly on what the underlying elements are.  Integration of 
whatever happens to be there is not clearly the way to go, because the aesthetic whole may be worse 
 This suggestion is due to Ken Gemes.41
 This theme of unity of the self as an aesthetic ideal is a key idea in Nehamas (1985). 42
 Cp. the discussion in Katsafanas (2011) and his example of Hemingway (98 ﬀ). 43
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than the one you end up with where the part is eliminated and integration then pursued. Consider 
the second reason for preferring integration: Is it a sign of strength that one has managed to carry 
oﬀ the integration? It may be, given that Nietzsche suggests that a frequent weakness of decadents is 
that they are not able to carry oﬀ this sublimation (TI, ‘Morality’, 2). But by the same token, the sort 
of discipline required for the weakening or the elimination of a drive would seem to require a great 
deal of strength and resolve too. It is not clear that the former bespeaks a stronger character than 
the latter in every case. Consider the third reason for preferring integration. Is it a sign of being 
satisfied with oneself that one works toward this integration and a sign of dissatisfaction that one 
works  toward  elimination  of  the  drive?  Probably  so.  But  being  satisfied  with  yourself  is  not 
necessarily  good,  and  being  dissatisfied  with  yourself  is  not  necessarily  bad.  The  last  men,  for 
example, are contemptible precisely in their blithely unwarranted self-satisfaction (TSZ, ‘Prologue’). 
A dose  of  dissatisfaction  might  well  be  beneficial.  What  matters  is  not  that  you  are  satisfied 
simpliciter, but that you are justifiedly satisfied, because you have a life and character worthy of that 
satisfaction. By the same token, being dissatisfied is not automatically bad, especially insofar as it is a 
spur to change. It may well be what prompts you toward self-overcoming. The point in GS, 290 is 
that you try to end up with a self you can (rightly) be satisfied with. It is neutral on whether this is 
accomplished through integration or elimination, and indeed it allows for both possibilities. 
What one needs here, I believe, is normative judgment. Not all drives, and not all parts of 
oneself are created equal. Some, it seems to me, and possibly to Nietzsche in D, 109, are ones that 
we would be better oﬀ without, even in whatever transmuted form they make take. This drive to 
alcohol may well be like that; a final judgment about it would ultimately depend on the details of the 
particular case and consideration of the relevant alternatives. But the important point I am trying to 
establish is that integration is not necessarily better as a course of action. The trouble with relying on 
a purely formal notion such as this (and the related dynamic one involving the will to power) is that 
it  is  not  plausible  that  they  can  function  as  successful  stand-alone  ideals.  Ancillary  normative 
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judgments will be necessary to determine whether, in a given case, integration or elimination is the 
route to take with a particular drive, following an assessment, in part, about whether the drive is 
going to prove good for one. 
What then of Nietzsche’s diagnoses of a tendency to extirpation as a sign of sickness? (TI, 
“Morality,” 2). The tendency to extirpation is problematic, it seems to me, not because extirpation 
per se is problematic, but because of the grounds on which it is undertaken. It matters why you are 
seeking  the  drive’s  removal  (on  moral  grounds,  or  more  pragmatic  ones)  and—this  is  where 
normativity enters yet again—whether that it is an appropriate grounds on which to be seeking its 
removal. The problematic cases of extirpation are the moralized ones, where the drive gets branded 
as evil. 
I’ve so far considered formal and dynamic notions to see how far they are able to take us. I’ve 
suggested that if we rely on these, we won’t be able to understand Nietzsche’s account of health in an 
adequate way. We will need to bring in normative notions as well. To that end, I have sketched the 
beginnings of an argument against formal and dynamic accounts, and the beginnings of an argument 
for why normative notions will be necessary. 
V. Conclusion
The work done in the main sections in this paper is cumulative, but independent. That is, 
one can accept and find useful my account of the Nietzschean marks of health in Sect III., without 
accepting my negative  arguments  against  the  formal  and dynamic strategy  in  Section IV.  But  I 
myself think that normativity is going to be inescapable here. 
It may be disappointing that I have not oﬀered some alternative unifying account of health, 
to replace the formal-dynamic one I have criticized. But it seems to me that no such account is in 
the  oﬃng.  We do better  to  think of  Nietzschean health  in  terms of  a  cluster  of  characteristic 
features. In fact, this seems to me to be the most plausible way of thinking about ordinary bodily 
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health as well.  It is a combination of the absence of certain negative features, coupled with the 
presence of certain positive features. These features are of course richly interrelated. But we should 
resist  the  temptation  of  thinking  that  it  is  somehow explanatorily  more  helpful  to  find  some 
abstract, totalizing way of having all these features tied together. For this reason, I focused the bulk 
of the paper on trying to illuminate this cluster of characteristics that are the marks of health.  
Given this,  however,  why think these characteristics speak to anything like a concept of 
health at all? When stretched so far, isn’t it just a catch-all positive evaluation, a sort of blanket term 
covering  everything  Nietzsche  approves  of?  I  think  this  is  an  important  concern.  But  it  is 44
important to see that health and other values can come apart.  For consider the relation of health to 45
other key Nietzschean character traits, for example, that of creativity. Creativity is a feature that 
Nietzsche clearly admires. Being deep and interesting are also features Nietzsche admires. All these 
characteristics play a role in certain forms of Nietzschean excellence. But excellence (of this form) 
and health are diﬀerent things. For one could be healthy, without being creative, deep, or interesting, 
and thus excellent in the way those features enable. Presumably this is true of the rampaging healthy 
nobles of GM I, who are excellent in some ways (good at warfare), but not in others. Health is thus 
an important value for Nietzsche, but it is in principle separable from some of his other core values. 
Indeed, we might go even further to say that it is sometimes in tension with his other values. One of 
Nietzsche’s recurring themes is how certain kinds of sickness (including sickness of the soul) are 
bound up  with  creativity  and  with  having  been  made  into  deep  and  interesting  creatures.  The 
simplistic Manichean idea, which Nietzsche can sometimes give the impression of endorsing, that 
the unhealthy is straightfowardly bad and the healthy straightforwardly good is one that is far from 
 My thanks to Reid Blackman for raising this objection. 44
 Cp. Huenemann (2013), ‘[Health] is a value Nietzsche never denigrates, abandons, or ‘revalues.’ Instead, it 45
becomes something of his own replacement for ‘the good,’  or ‘knowledge,’  or ‘truth,’  or any of the other 
traditional philosophical values Nietzsche calls into question’ (68). 
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obvious, when things are looked at through another, more complicated Nietzschean lens.  For that 46
matter, the equally Manichean idea that are two basic and starkly distinguished camps—the healthy 
and the sick—may be far more complicated. In many people, there are traits of both, and health may 
similarly be thought of as coming in degrees.  47
It bears noting that in claiming that there is a key normative dimension of health, I have not 
taken a stand on any meta-ethical or meta-axiological issues. For all I’ve said so far, these normative 
notions necessary for Nietzsche’s judgments about health may be rooted in nothing more than his 
personal  preferences.  Thus,  even  if  we  attribute  to  Nietzsche  a  strong  anti-realism about  the 
normative domain, this shouldn’t lead us to conclude that he can’t—and doesn’t—make essential use 
of normative notions at the first-order level in his account of what health is and in his judgments 
about who is healthy. 
In claiming that health, as Nietzsche uses it, is a normatively laden notion, I’ve suggested 
that whether someone is healthy is not going to be determined by the investigation of a set of purely 
descriptive facts. It will bring in value judgments, at least those from Nietzsche’s perspective. Health 
of the soul is not a value-free concept. It is one in which Nietzsche’s values come very much into 
play. This seems to me to be wholly in keeping with the tendentious use that Nietzsche makes of it.  48
 I discuss these matters further in Huddleston (2015). On these issues, see also Neuhouser (2014). On this 46
topic,  I  have  benefited  greatly  from discussion  with  Ken  Gemes,  and  adopt  the  term ‘Manichean’  here, 
following his suggestion. 
 I thank Gudrun von Tevenar for suggesting this point. 47
 This paper was initially written for a conference on ‘Nietzsche on Health’ at Colgate University. My thanks 48
to Maude Clark and David Dudrick for the invitation that was the impetus for first writing this piece. My 
thanks are due as well to Ken Gemes, John Richardson, and Jon Webber for their very helpful comments and 
email  correspondence.  I  also  owe a  great  debt  to  audiences  at  Colgate  University,  Cardiff  University,  the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences History and Philosophy of Science Group, and especially the International 
Society for Nietzsche Studies in Bonn for a thoroughly stimulating discussion of it. 
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